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IN TBE SUPREME COURT
of lhe
STATE 01' UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (
vs.

JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Ca;se No. 8868

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The defendant and Appellant will be referred to as
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will be referred
to as the State.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Charles Merrifield was slhot to death on the 19th day
of June, 1957 at the Rattle Snake mine in San Juan County,
Utah. A Complaint was filed against James W. Rodgers on
the 22nd day of June, 1957, which read in words and figures
as follows, to-wit:
"IN THE CITY COURT OF MONTICELLO
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT
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STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SAN JUAN )
On the 22nd day of June, 1957, before me, Ralph J.
Hafen, Judge of the above entitled Court City of Monticello, San Juan CountY, State of Utah, personally appeared
R. D. McAlister who, being duly sworn by me, on his oath did
say that James W. Rodgers on the 19th day of June, 1957,
at and in the County of San Juan, State of Utah unlawfully
did commit the crime of murder in the manner as follows,
to wit: that at the time and place aforesaid James W.
Rodgers murdered Charles T. Merrifield. Contrary to the
form of the statute in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
/s/ R. D. McALISTER
Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year
first above written.
lsi RALPH J. HAFEN
Judge
I approve issuance of a "·arrant of arrest on the foregoing complaint.
Is! F. BENNION REDD

County Attorney "
On the 22nd da~· of June a \V arrant of Arrest was
signed which rca,; in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
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"IN THE CITY COURT OF MONffiCELLO
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
vs.
JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant

WARRANT OF ARREST

STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF SAN JUAN
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN
THE STATE
A complaint, upon oath, !having been made this day
before me Ralph J. Hafen Judge of the above entitled Court,
by R. D. McAl,ister that the offense of m.:arder has been
committed, and accusing James W. Rodgers thereof;
You are commanded to arrest the above named James
W. Rodgers and bring him before me forthwith at my office
in Monticello, U ta'h.
WITNESS mY hand at Monticello, Utah this 22nd day
of June, 1~57.
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN

Judge"
The defendant, James W. Rodger,s, wa,s apprehended
without inci•tent at Cortez, Colorado on the morning of the
20 of June, 1957 and voluntarily returned to Monticello,
Utah.
On June 26, 1957 a Preliminary Hearing was had before the Honorable Ralph J. Hafen, Judge of the City Court
at Monticello, Utah, at which time the complaint was read
to the defendant, as appears from reading the transcript
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of the preliminary hearing. Quoting from the transcript
orf tlhe preliminary hearing, page 3, lines 17 through 30,
and page 4, lines 1 through 18 :
THE COURT: You will listen to a reading of the
complaillJt by the acting clerk of the court.
THE REPORTER: In the City Court of Monticello.
State of Utah, v·s. James W. Rodgers, Defendant. Complaint.
State of Utah, County of San Juan, ss.
On the 22nd day of June ,1957, before me, Ralph J. Hafen, Judge of the above entitled Court, City of Monticello, San
Juan County, State of Utah, personally appeared R. D.
McAlister who, being duly sworn by me, on his oath did
say that James W. Rodgers on the 19th day of June, 1957,
at and in the County of San Juan, State of Utah unlawfully
did commit the crime of murder in the manner as follows,
to wit: That at the time and place aforesaid James W.
Rodgers murdered Charles T. 1\/[errirfield. Contrary to the
form of the statute in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah.
/s/ R. D. McALISTER
Subscribed and sworn to before me the day and year
first above written.
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN
Judge

I approve issuance of a warrent of arres-t on the foregoing complaint.
Is/ F. BENNION REDD
County Attorney
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THE COURT: You have listened, Mr. Rodgers, to a
reading of the charge as s·et forth in the complaint and you
have been charged with the crime of murder.
Do you have an attorney?
MR. RODGERS: I do.
THE COURT: And is Mr. Gibson your attorney?
MR. RODGERS: That is right."
The Court made the following finding at the conclusion
of the evidence at the Preliminary Hearing, see page 96,
lines 3 through 16 of the transcript of the Hearing:
"THE COURT: It is the finding of this Court that the
defendant in this case - what is his full name?
MR. REDD: James W. Rodgers.
THE COURT: James W. Rodgers let me start again.

strike that and

It is the judgement of this Court that there being
shown by the State of Utah evidence which gives the Court
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed in this
County and that ~there is rewsonable cause to believe that
the defendant in this action, James Rodgers, committed
said crime, it is the order of the Court that he be bound
over to the Dis•trict Court to answer to the same and for
all further proceedings in this case."

On the 26th day of June, 1957 the following statement was typed on the back of the Complaint:
"It appearing to me that the offense in witlhin
Complaint mentioned has been committed and that
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there i1s sufficient cause to believe the within named
Defendant, James W. Rodgers, guilty thereof, I order
that 'he be held to answer to the same and he is hereby
committed to the Sheriff of the County of San Juan,
Stllite of Utah, without bail pending further proceedings in the District Court of San Juan County, State
of Utah.
Is! RALPH J. HAFEN

Judge
Dated: June 26, 1957."
On the 26th day of June an information was prepared
by the District Attorney of the Seventh Judicial District,
which read in words and figures as follows, to-wit:

"INFORMATION
James W. Rodgers having been on the 26th day of
June, 1957, by Ralph J. Hafen, Judge of the Monticello
Oity Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah, duly
committed to answer to the crime of murder in the first
degree, is accused by Boyd Bunnell, District Attorney of
the Seventh Judicial District, of said crime committed as
follows:
That said Defendant, on or about the 19th day of
June, 1957, murdered Charles T. Merrifield.
Is! BOYD BUNNELL

District Attorney
The following witnesses testified for the State at the
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Preliminary hearing:
D. B. Ingram, Moab, Utah
Harold E. Pickens, Moab, Utah
'I'homas M. Thompson, Moab, Utah
Ben R. Goodnight, Moab, Utah
Chauncey E. Black, Blanding, Utah
Seth F. Wright, Monticello, Utah"
On the 6th day of August, 1957 the defendant was
brought before the Seventh Judicial District Court in and
for San Juan County, Utah for arraignment, the transcript
of which reads in part as follows:
·Quoting from page 2, lines 28 through 30, and page 3,
lines 1 through 30, and page 4, lines 1 through 12.
"MR. GIBSON: If Your Honor please, we move that
the Information be quashed on the grounds that this Defendant hasn't had a preliminary hearing un the charge of
first degree murder.
THE COURT. You want to argue the motion?
MR. GIBSON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right, I will set it down for argument at 3:30 p. m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may
be heard, if that is agreeable to you.
(Further proceedings continued until 3:30 o'clock p. m.)
THE COURT: In case No. 243 there is a motion to
quash the Information for failure to state what?
MR. GIBSON: For the reason that the Defendant hasn't
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had a preliminary hearing on the first degree murder
charge.
THE COURT: Very well, I will hear your argument.
(Counsel for the Defendant and the State made oral
arguments to the Court.)
THE COURT: Court is in session and the record may
show that the accused and his counsel and counsel for the
State are here. The motion to quash the Information upon
the ground that the Defendant has had no preliminary
hearing on the charge stated in the Information is denied
and overruled. Now are you ready to plead?
MR. GIBSON: We are ready to plead, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step forward, Mr. Rodgers.
Now under the old, under the old code we, if you desired
to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity you had
to so state. I don't think that that is required now, but I
think that you merely need to announce your intention torely upon insanity as a defense, but if you want to make your
plea that way MH. GIBSON: Well, I have checked that, if Your
Honor please, and I am inclined to think the law is as you
say, but to be sure about it and safeTHE COURT: You want to plead as the old statute
required.
MR. GIBSON: Yes, I want.
THE COURT: To the Information that has been read
to you, what i~ rour plea, guilty or not guilty?
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MR. RODGERS: Not guilty.
MR. GIBSON: And not guilty by reason of insanity."
On the 7th day of December, 1957 the Defendant filed
a Motion to Quash the Information or in Lieu Thereof to
Amend Same, which said motion reads in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
"IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant.

CRIMINAL NO. 243

MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN
LIEU THEREOF TO AMEND SAME
The defendant James W. R'Odgers by and through his
attorneys A. Reed Reynolds and Robert H. Ruggeri moves
the Court for an order Quashing the Information or in Lieu
Thereof fior an order amending same for the reason and
upon the grounds herein set 'fortJh as follows:
1. That said Information does not charge the defendant
with the commissi1on of the o:ffense charged in :the COJYloo
plaint, upon Which the preliminary hearing was held, and
for which he was bound over to the District Court for trial.

2. That the Court trying the cause has no jurisdiction
of the offense charged in tihe Information or of the person
of the defendant.
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3. That an Information was filed without the defendant
first having had or waived a preliminary examination on
the ofrfense charged in the information.
4. That the prosecuting attorney had no authority to
file the Information covering the offense charged in the
Information.
That in lieu of quashing the information that the same
be amended by order of this Court to conform to the offense charged in the complaint, upon which the preliminary
hearing was based, and to conform to the offense for which
the defendant was bound over to the District Court to
stand trial.
This motion is based upon the complaint, transcript
of the preliminary hearing, the Information, and any and all
other proper statutes, records and files thereto appertaining.
Dated this 7th day of December, A. D., 1957.
A. REED REYNOLDS and
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
I sl Robert H. Ruggeri
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds
NOTICE OF MOTION
TO: The Honorable Boyd Bunnell District Attorney for
the Seventh Judicial District.
Please take notice that the undersigned will bring the
above Motion on for hearing before the Court at the courtroom thereof in the Court House at Monticello, San Juan
County, State of Utah, on the lOth day of December, A.
D., 1957. at the hour of 10:00 o'clock A. M., or as soon
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thereafter as counsel can be heard.
Dated this 7th day of December, A. D., 1957.
A. REED REYNOLDS and
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
Is/ Robert H. Ruggeri
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds
Attorneys for the defendant"
That on December 11, 1957 the above entitled case
came on regularly for hearing at which time oral arguments were presented to the Court on the defendant's
motion to quash the information or in lieu thereof to amend
same. and the Court made its ruling which appears in the
reporter's transcript of the trial as follows:
Page 4, lines 13 through 30, and page 5, lines 1
through 3.
"THE COURT: I have heretofore considered the pronouncement of our Supreme Court on this prorl~m. I may
not :have made the right interpretation of what they have
said nor reached the right conclusion with respect to it,
and if I am in error, of course the Supreme Court will
correct me. I have already ruled in this case on this proposition. And taking 77-21-38 and giving it what I think is
the plain meaning of t hat statute I reached the conclusion
that the complaint charged murder in the first degree.
Because the section says plainly that where an offense
is divided in degrees, a charge that the offense was committed includes all of the degrees. So I conclude that the
complaint in this case charged murder in the first degree
and that the information doesn't charge a crime on which
he hasn't had a preliminary hearing. And what I have said
1
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applies to other items specified in the motion. I therefore
deny the motion. I hope, however, gentlemen, that if there is
a verdict that you don't like in this case that you will gu
up to the Supreme Court and see what they have to say
about it. Trial courts make errors and I may have made one
here. I'if I havE, I want to be corrected, but that is my best
judgment, gentlemen."
The defendant then made an objection to the introduction of any testimony with respect to first degree
murder.
See page 5, lines 25 through 30, and page 6, line 1 of
the transcript of the trial:
"MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, may the record also
show that the Defendant makes an objection to the introduction of any testimany with respect to first degree
murder, and that that objection will continue throughout
the entire trial?
THE COURT: You may have that objection, and the
objection is overruled."
i

On the 14th day of December, 1957, the jury returned
a verdict of Guilty 0f Murder in the First Degree without
a recommendation of leniency.
1

On December 19, 1957, the defendant made a Motion
in Arrest Otf Judgment and Motion for New Trial, which
read in words and figures as f10llows:
"IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant.

MOTION IN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT
Criminal No. 243

Comes now the Defendant and moves the above entitled Court for an order arresting judgment in this case
pursuant to Sections 77-34-1 and 77-35-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 on the following grounds.
1. That the facts proved at the trial of this matter do
not constitute a public ofrfense for the reason that the Defendant was in such a mental condition as to proclude him
from forming the required specific intent.
2. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-35-10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, the judgment should be arrested for
the following reasons to wit:
(a) That the Defendant is insane, and,
(b) That the above entitled Court was without jurisdiction to try the Defendant for the crime of
Murder in the First Degree because the Defendant
was charged in the Complaint with what constitutes the crime of Murder in the Second Degree;
that the preliminary hearing was based upon said
Complaint and that the Defendant was bound over
by the Committing Magistrate to stand trial for
the offense stated in the Complaint, to wit: Murder in the Second Degree.
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Dated this 19th day of December, 1957.
A. REED REYNOLDS AND
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
Attorneys for Defendant
Moab, Utah
By Is/ A. Reed Reynolds
Received a copy of the foregoing Motion in Arrest of
Judgment this 19th day of December, 1957.
Is/BOYD BUNNELL
District Attorney "
"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plainti'ff,
vs.
MOTION FOR NE'V TRIAL
Criminal No. 243
JAMES W. RODGERS,
Defendant
Comes now the Defendant and moves the above entitled Court for an order granting him a new trial on the
following grounds, to wit:
That the verdict rendered in this case is not supported by the evidence and is in fact contrary to the evidence.
Dated this 19th day of December, 1957.
A. REED REYNOLDS AND
ROBERT H. RUGGERI
Attorneys for Defendent
Moab, Utah
By I sf A. Reed Reynolds
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Received a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial
this 19th day of December, 1957.

Is/ BOYD BUNNELL
District Attorney "
The Motion in Arrest of Judgment and the Motion for
a New Trial were argued and overruled.
See Page 291, lines 24 through 30, and page 292, lines
1 through 11 of the transcript of the trial:
"(At this Ume the Court heard the oral arguments of
counsel on the motion for a new trial.)
THE COURT: The motion for a new trial is denied
and overruled. Do you want to argue your motion in
arrest of judgment?
MR. REYNOLDS: I might just point out, if the Court
please, that the ground number 1 stated in the motion is based on substantially the same matter I argued with respect to
the motion for a new trial. And the second ground set forth
in the motion in arrest of judgement is with respect to the
matter once directed to this Court by Mr. Ruggeri and myself and that goes to the Complaint and the crime charged
at that time and also the [orm of the Information charging
first degree murder, and the Court has heard our argument
in connection with that.
THE COURT: The motion in arrest of judgment is
denied and overruled. We will be in recess for five minutes
and I would like to confer with counsel in chambers."
Sentence was pronounced on Defendant. See page 292,
lines 14 through 30, page 293, lines 1 through 30, and page
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294, lines 1 through 6 of the transcript of the trial as
follows:

"THE COURT: You will stand before the Court, James
W. Rodgers. James W. Rodgers, you are charged by an
Information filed in this Court with commission of the
crime of murder. It was charged in this Infonnation that
on or about the 19th day of June 1957, within this county
you murdered Charles Merrifield. To that Information you
entered a plea of not guilty. You were without funds to
employ counsel for your defense and upon that being made
to appear to the satiSifaction of the Court I appointed the
two gentlemen that now stand by you as your counsel to
defend you. A jury was impaneled and sworn and heard
the evidence in support of the Information and in your
defense. That jury returned a verdict finding you guilty
of murder in the first degree without a recommendation
of imprisonment for life. In that situation, the Court is
bound by law to impose upon you the death penalty. Have
you any legal reason tJ state why the judgment and sentence af the Court should not be pronounced? You may answer that, gentlemen.
MR. ·RUGGERI: Do we have? Do you have anything
to

~say?

MR. RODGERS: No.
MR. REYNOLDS: No, Your Honor.
MR. RUGGERI: No, Your Honor. No, Your Honor, we
don't have any reason.
THE COURT: Do you have anything you wish to
direct to the Court?
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MR. RODGERS: Only that the execution take place
as quickly as possible.
THE COURT: Under the law :of this State, one convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree without
a recommendation of imprisonment for life has the right
to make an election between hanging and shooting as a
means of having his life extinguished. What election do
you make?
MR. RODGERS: Shooting.
THE COURT: The judgment and sentence of the Court
is that you, James W. Rodgers, be executed by shooting. I
fix the 17th day of March 1958, at sunrise on that day as the
date for y:our execution, and you are committed to the
custody of the Sheriff of this county who is charged with
the execution orf this sentence. Now I take it if there are
nro objections, no good objection, this man may be taken
forthwith to the State Prison. This execution is to occur
within the outer walls of the State Prison.
MR. REYNOLDS: I don't know of any reason why he
shouldn't be.
THE COURT: I have fixed this date as the 17th day
of March to give your counsel ample time to prepare an
appeal to the Supreme Court. They advised me that you
don't want to appeal. The Oourt is of the opinion, however,
tha.t in such a case as this that an appeal should be had so
tha:t what we have done here in this courtroom may be
screened very carefully by a higher Court than this. You
are committed to the custody of the Sheriff. Is there anything further that you wish to direct to the Court? Court
is in recess."
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Record on appeal was filed April 1, 1958.
POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL
Defendant, appellant herein, declares that the lower
court erred in this cause and that its decision should be
reversed because:
POINT I
The complaint charged the Defendant with "murder"
and he was bound over to stand trial for "murder" which
is a definitive term not constituting a public offense under
the laws of this state, under these circumstances a conviction of murder in the first degree is contrary to and in
violation of the laws of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of Utah and of the Constitution of the
United States of America.
POINT II
That the Court erred in not granting Defendant's
motinn to quash the information made at the time of arraignment and before plea on the grounds that the Defendant did not have a preliminary hearing on the charge
of first degree murder and the Court therefore was without jurisdiction to hear the case.
POINT III
That the Court erred in ~overruling the Defendant's
motion to quash the information or in lieu thereof to amend
same to conform tYJ the charge that was made in the original
complaint and the charge for which the Defendant was
bound over by the committing magistrate to stand trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
POINT IV
That the court erred in overruling the Defendant's
objection to the introduction of any testimony with respect
to first degree murder.

POINT V
That the Court erred in overruling Defendant's motion in Arrest of Judgment based on the following grounds:
(a) That the Defendant is insane, and,
(b) That the Trial Oourt was without jurisdiction to
try the Defendant for the crime of murder in the
first degree because the Defendant was charged
in the complaint with what constitutes the crime
of murder in the second degree; that the preliminary hearing was based upon said complaint and
that the defendant was bound over by the committing magistrate to stand trial for the offense
stated in the complaint to wit: Murder in the
second degree.

POINT VI
That the Court erred in overruling the Defendant's
motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict
rendered in this case is not supported by the evidence and
is in fact contrary to the uncontradicted evidence that the
defendant was suffering ff!om an organic mental disorder
which rendered him insane and incapable of controlling his
actions.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
"76-1-11. "CRHJ.IE" DEFINED. offense is an act committed or omitted
forbidding or commanding it, and to
upon Clonviction, any of the following

A crime or public
inviolation of a law
which is annexed,
punishments:

(1) Death.
(2- Imprisonment.
(3) Fine.
( 4) Removal from office.
(5) Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust or profit in this state."
"76-30-1. "MURDER" DEFINED. - Murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethoug·ht.
"76-30-3. DEGREES OF MURDER. - Every murder
perpetrated by poison, lying in ,,-ait or any other kind of
wilful, deliberate, malic~ous and premeditated killing; or
committed in the perpetratiJn of, or attempt to perpetrate,
any arson, rape, burglary or robbery : or perpetrated from
a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect
the death of any human being other than the one who is
killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the
lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless
of human life; - is murder in the first degree. Any other
homicide c10mmit h'd under such circumstances as would
have constituted murder at common law is murder in the
second degree."
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"76-30-4. PENALTY FOR MURDER.- Every person
guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or,
upon the recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned
at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the discretion
of the court. Every person guilty of murder in the second
degree shall be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison
for a term which shall be not less than ten years and which
may be for life."
(a) Constitutional Provisions
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION provides:
Article V of the Amendments:
"No persron shall be held to answer for a capitol, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense and be twice put in jeopardy of life
and limb; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property,
withouf due process of law."
I

Article VI of the Amendments:
"In all criminal prosecuHons, the accused shall enjoy
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation;"
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH provides:
Article 1 Section 12
"In criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testirfy in his, own behalf,
and be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
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c:ompulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed and the right to appeal
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not
be compelled to give evidence against himself; and a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her ·husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense."
It is the contention of this Defendant that the legislature in dividing murder into first degree murder and secDnd degree murder and prescribing to the respective penalties
therefor has created two crimes, the first of which necessarily includes the second as a lessor included offense. However,
tfue first just as certainly is not included in the second. This
contention is born out by the Supreme Court of Utah in the
case of State v. Avery, Supreme Court of Utah, 125 P. 2d
803. The Defendant in the Avery case was accused in tihe Information of murder in the first degree and made the contention that under the laws of this state, there was no such
crime as murder in the first degree. In its determination,
the Court, speaking through Judge Keller, DL:\rict Judge,
used the following language.

"Sec. 103-1-11 defining "crinw"; Sec. 103-28-1 defining "murder"; See. 103-28-3 diYiding murder into two degrees and defining eac·h; and See. 103-28-4 prescribing
penalty for fir~i and second degree murder.
The provisions of these sections are interrelated and in-
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terdependent, so to speak, and from them we may make a
number of c·onclusions, neither of which bears out the contention of the appelant. We may logically say that murder
is a crime because it is an act punishable by death, or, upon
recommendation of a jury, impriHonment for life, if of the
first degree; or by imprisonment for a term not less than
ten years and which may be r.for life, if of the second degree. Or, it is equally sound to say that the three sections
considered together create two crimes; Murder in the first
degree, because a punishment by death or life imprisonment
is provided for the killing of a human being with malice
aforethought, committed under the circumstances or having the qualities of premeditation and deliberation provided
in the first sentence of 103-28-3; murder in the second degree, because a punishment of imprisonment of not less
than ten years and which may be for life for the killing of
a human being with malice aforethought, where the circumstaces of aggravation which are present in murder of
the first degree are absent, and under such circumstances
as would have constituted murder at common law. But
whether we consider murder in the first degree as only a
grade or degree of murder, or as a separate crime, it} is
nevertheless a crime as defined by Section 103-1-11, supra."
In the Avery case, unlike the case at hand, the Court
points out, at page 805 - By the recital that the defendant
was accused of murder in the first degree, the accuser
made the informati·on definite and certain as to the punishment that would be demanded.
Under the constitutional provisions, as under the old
common law, a person accused of a crime is entitled to be,
at all stages of the proceedings, advised of the crime with
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which he is charged . This principle was followed in
People vs. Hill, Supreme Court of Utah, 3 U 334 3P 75. On
page 78 of the Pacific He porter, the Court state as follows:
"Section 158 of that act declares that the indictment
is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom, among other
things not called in question here, that the act or omission
charged as the offense is clearly and distinctly set forth,
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable the
court to understand what is intended, and to pronounce
judgment, upon conviction, according to the right of the
case. It is sufficient if the charge be stated with s·o much
certainty that the defendant may know what he is called
upon to answer, and the court how to render judgment. In
other words, substantial justice should be more sought
after than artificial nicety.
"Even under the above liberal rule, laid down by the
legislature as our guide in determining its sufficiency, it
is the duty of the prosecution to so frame every indictment
as to apprise the defendant, with a reasonable degree of
certainty, 10f the character of the charge preferred against
him. The absence of a direct allegation of anything essential in the description of the substance, character, or manner of the crime, cannot be supplied by intendment. It is
as much an essential requisite, under our criminal practice
act, as it ever was, that all matter material to constitute
the particular crime charged should be alleged with such
positiveness and distinctness as not to need the aid of intendment or implication. All this is embraced in the fundamental declaration that it is the right of eYery person accused 'Of a crime to be informed of the nature and cause of
the aecusation. These rules do not require any hypercritical
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construction and interpretation of an indictment on the
part of the court."
Stated in another way, it is the defendant Rodgers'
contention any charge against any defendant must contain such facts as to accomplish the following objects:
1. To completely and fully advise the Defendant of
the crime with which he is charged so that he can prepare
his defense ;
2. To protect the Defendant in the event he is again
placed in jeopardy for the same offense or crime ; and,
3. To sufficiently advise the Court in order that it may
render proper judgment and sentence in the event the
Defendant is found guilty.
In the case of People vs. Bogdanoff, 256 New York 16,
171 N. E. 890, 69 A. L. R. 1378, the Court said on page
1382 of 69 A. L. R. as follows:
"In this jurisdiction the courts have used a similar
test in determining the sufficiency of indictments. In
People vs. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413, 417, 155 N. E. 724,
725, the court said, per Pound, J.: 'The indictment is
sufficient, if it identifies the charge against the defendant, so that his conviction or acquittal may prevent a subsequent charge for the same offense; notifies
him of the nature and character of the crime charged
against him to the end that he may prepare his defense; and enables the court upon conviction to pronounce judgment according to the right of the case.'
In other jurisdictions the test has been at times form-
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ulated in other manner, but the test has been essentially the same."
It will be noted in the Bogdanoff case unlike the case
at bar, that the indictm·ent charged the accused with
"murder in the first degree, contrary to the Penal Law,
Section 104.4." The Court considered that the defendant
was not in actual doubt as to the act to be proved against
him. In doing so, however, the Court disapproved of the
form of indictm·ent and indicated in other cases it might
be declared insufficient.

Note the language of the Court found at page 1387
of 69 A. L. R.
"The new forms may at times prove unwise. Doubtless if district attorneys insist upon using the form
employed here, they will at times be unable to meet
a challenge to the sufficiency of the description of a
crime. Extraneous evidence may still leave uncertain
at times whether an indictment for 'murder' or 'larceny' covers one crime or several. The evidence presented to t.he grand jury might cover several connected
homicides or a series of defalcations with nothing to
demonstrated which crime ·of the series \Yas intended
to be the subject of the charge. Then the courts will
be compelled to discharge the accused. Too often the
courts are called upon to po:nt out that innovation
does not necessarily imply improvement. "·ith equal
t~af'e and with greater certa :nt~· the district attorney
might have used, if he had chosen, a more precise form
of indictment not subject to any possible claim that
the indictment did not describe the same crime covered
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by the bill of particulars. There must in every case be
identity of accusation, and the indictment must describe the crime upon which the accused is held. It is
the duty of the district attorney to formulate that description with such precision that it cannot be successfully challenged."
In the case of State v. Spencer, Supreme Court :of Utah,
121 P. 2d 912 on petition for rehearing the court said:
"(1-3) The issues established by an information or
a complaint and the plea of not guilty thereto constitute the foundation of each criminal trial. Upon those
issues the relevancy of the proffered evidence is determined, such for instance as the question of the relevancy of the facts, ultimate or probative, set out in
the bill of particulars. Under section 105-21-10, Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1935 (our new code of criminal
procedure), those issues are used to determine the sufficiency or the consistency of the particulars outlined
in the bill of particulars. In the recent case of State
v. Hill, Utah, 116 P. 2d 392, 397, we said: 'It is elemental that where a bill of particulars is furnished it
may not set out a different crime than that charged in
the information.' If, then, the information is indefinite
as to the offense charged it is :of no help in deciding
those questions of the relevancy of evidence or those
questions of the application of section 105-21-10, supra.
"Our penal code defines certain offenses in general
terms: Murder, section 103-28-1; manslaughter, 10328-5; larceny, 103-36-1; perjury, section 2, Chapter
134, Laws of Utah 1937- there may be others. Under
each are set out, either as degrees of the general cla:ss

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
!Or designated by individual names, the offenses to
which specific penalties
a r .e attached,
the
penalties being graded in severity according
to the seriuosness of the particular degree,
Assume that I am bound over to stand trial for murder
in the second degree. The district attorney files against
me an informati-on charging as follows: E. P. murdered
C. D. ( see form 'murder', section 105-21-47, Chapter
118, Laws of Utah 1935). Assume that upon the face
of that information there are no words limiting 'murdered' to either degree. At m:J~ trial the prosecution
offers evidence of murder in t:1e first degree. I object
upon the ground that the offense with which I am
charged is murder in the second degree. But the issue
established by my plea of not guilty to the charge in
that information is not limited to either degree, and
is broad enough to include both. The allegations of that
information are of no aid to a s:olution of the question
raised by my objection. No particular offense has been
charged against me. There is no punishment for merely the general definition of murder. An accused is not
found guilty of a clas~ of oifenses, but of one of the
class (see section 103-:25-9, Chapter 122. Laws of Utah
1935, hereinafter discu.3secl). This Spencer case parallels my illustration, substituting the offense of perjury
for that of murder."
"Assume an accused is bound over to stand trial
for murder in the first degree. The inf'Ormation filed
charges the offense b~· general definition, to wit, murder - no degree is mentioned. A bill of particulars is
furnished. InadYertently the prosecution omits some
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of the facts which it believes will support first degree
murder. This results in the bill supporting only murder in the second degree. The accused moves to quash
the information on the ground that the facts set out
are not sufficient to support murder in the first degree. The prosecution, discovering the error, moves
for permission to include the additional facts, contending that they have charged the greater offense.
Section 105-21-10, supra, requires a compadson of the
bill with the information to determine the sufficiency
of the former. Such a comparison in this assumed case
is of no aid to a solution of these motions. The information, if good at all, is good for either degree of the
offens'e, but which one is intended is not indicated.
"(5) The information or the complaint, as the case
may be, should stand upon its own feet. Until a particular offense as distinguished from the general definition of the class of offenses, is charged, the accused should be under no obligation to demand a bill
of particulars at the risk of waiving some of his rights
by failure to make such demand. Incidently, of the
bill of particulars was contemplated as the means of
supplying elementary defects in the information, then
of what use are sections 105-21-12 to 16, both inclusive,
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1935? These sections cover
matters of time, place, value or price, and ownership.
This brings me to a discussion of certain sections of tlhis
new code upon which respondent sem's to place considerable reliance.
Under the old form of pleading, facts were alleged
directed to the particular degree of the offense, wheth-
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er named as a degree or by an individual name. The
objection to the old form of pleading was its verbosity
and complexity. See the quotations in State v. Hill,
supra. To avoid such pleading, the legi~Slature adopted
the simple form of pleading of Chapter 118, supra.
In adopting that chapter, however, the legislature
had no intention of permitting the prosecution to jeopardize the accused's rights by evasiveness nor vacillation. The accused is an inocent man. His prosecution
-and the prosecutor-should be impartial. It is as much
the duty of the prosecution to recognize his innocence
as it is to accomplish a conviction, if the facts justify
it. The code of criminal procedure is not intended as
a substitute for insufficient facts.
Section 105-21-8 of Chapter 118 permits charging
the offense by name, by definition, or by section or
subsection number. These methods of pleading may be
accompHshed by referring to the offense by the name
given to the degree, by defining the degree :of the offense, or by referring to the section and subsection
number of the degree of the defense. For all practical
purposes it is no more verbose nor complex to refer to
to the offense as murder in the second degree than
to !Say merely murder - the former has the advantage
of being definite in substance and as to penalty."
"Are the forms given in section 105-21-47 to be used
blindly, or are they to be used with modification or
limitation as our penal code or the rights of the accused may require? The latter seems the sensible conclusion to reach. Again I invite attention to sections
105-21-12 to 16 indu~in.'. These ~'ections imply the use
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of more particularity than is required by the forms
found in section 105-21-47. I am of the opinion that
these forms are merely exemplary, and are not intended as sufficient if they do not include the elements
or the name of the particular offense defined in the
penal code, for which a penalty is provided."
"(7) In 27 Am. Jur. 655 at page 666, section 105,
there is a brief discussion of such sections as this.
Reference is made to the case of State v. Roy, 40 N.
M. 397, 60 P. 2d 646, 658, 110 A. L. R. 1. In New
Mexico the information and the bill of particulars are
considered together to determine the offense charged.
In this cited case the offense charged is murder in
the first degree. Speaking of a \Section of their rules of
practice similar to the section of our code quoted above,
the court said: 'We have held that the charge of first
degree murder includes second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Under the present practice an
information in one count charging murder in the first
degree includes therein murder in the second degree
and voluntary manslaughter.' Such a statement does
not answer the question of how to charge only the
lesser degree in an information - may it be charged
simply as murder, or should it be charged as murder
in the second degree? If the former is to be the interpretation, then one is met with the uncertainties and
and indefinitness I have illustrated and discussed in
this opinion; not to mention the grave question of
whether or not section 105-21-38 quoted above does
away with due process for the accused. I have in mind
the principles applied in cases where state legislatures
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sought to eliminate the necessity of supporting enhanced penalties by pleading, and which efforts of the
legislatures have been held unconstitutional. One of
those cases from Massachusetts (Com. v. Harrington,
130 Mass. 35) is cited in the annotation to 58 A. L. R.
20, at page 67. This section 105-21-38 should be limited to the meaning given to it by the New Mexico
eourt - that when the greater offense is charged it
includes the lesser without specific allegation of the
latter.
The penalty attached to an offense is of importance
to the accused. It may mean the difference between
prison and jail for him; it may mean the difference
between a felony and a misdemeanor; or it may determine his right to bail (105-44-3 and 4, R. S. U. 1933).
In cases calling for enhanced penalties for habitual
criminals the authorities uphold the neces·sity of pleading to support the additional penalty. 25 Am. Jur. 273
secti:on 26; 14 R. C. L. 190 section 366; and the annotations in 58 A. L. R. 20, at page 64; 82 A. L. R. 366,
and 116 A. L. R. 229. In the forms of 104-21-47, supra,
is one for habitual criminals, setting out pleading of
the previous conviction. The accused is as much interested in the initial penalty as he is in an enhanced
penalty. It would seem, then, that if the enhanced
penalty must be supported by a pleading indicating
that such a penalty is in order in a particular case, the
initial penalty should also be so supported. But it is
not so support~d if the accused is unable to determine
from the information or the complaint which penalty
is applicable to the ca -:;e.
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(8) Respondent cites section 105-25-9, Chapter 122,
Laws of Utah 1935. It reads: 'Where an information
or indictment charged an offense which is decided into
degrees without specifying the degree, if the defendant
pleads guilty generally the court shall, before accepting
the plea, examine witnesses to determine the degree
of the offense of which the defendant is guilty.'
This section is not evidence that the legislature
thought the degree of crime was only material when it
ca:me time to impose sentence. The section provides
that befnre the plea is accepted - not before penalties
are imposed - the degree of the offense must be determined. It is a strange thought, indeed, that an information charging an offense by general definition
is not sufficient to support a plea of guilty where there
is no controversy between the parties, and yet, that
same information is sufficient to support a plea of not
guilty where there is a controversy between the
parties, which controversy may raise many questions
the solution of which depends upon the degree of the
offense intended to be charged. It is not sufficient to
answer that section 105-25-9, supra, was passed to
prevent an accused from being placed twice in jeopardy
for the same offense. The accused is as greatly concerned about his life or liberty being jeopardized once
as he is about the possibility of a second offense. This
section is rather srtrong evidence that in the eyes of
the legislature pleading by general definition was not
considered sufficient foundation for a trial and conviction of an accused.
In conclusion I quote from the prevailing opinion in
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People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890, 895,
69 A. L. R. 1378, cited in the case of State v. Hill,
supra, upholding the short form of pleading: 'The new
forms may at tlmes prove unwise. Doubtless if district attorneys insist upon using the form employed
here, they will at times be unable to meet a challenge
to the sufficiency of the description of a crime. Extraneous evidence may still leave uncertain at times
whether an indictment for 'murder' or 'larceny' covers
one crime or several. The evidence presented to the
grand jury might cover several connert.oo homicides
or a series of defalcations with nothing to demonstrate
which crime of the series was intended to be the subject of the charge. Then the courts will be compelled
to discharge the accused. Tho often the courts are called upon to point out that innovation does not necessarily imply improvement. 'Vith equal ease and with
greater certainty the district attorney might have
used, iJf he had chosen, a more precise form of indictment not subject to any possible claim that the indictment did not describe the same crime covered by
the bill of particulars. There must in every case be
identity of accusation, and the indictment must describe the crime upon which the accused is held.' "
It is the further contention of the defendant Rodgers
that if any interpretation at all can be placed on the charge
that was made against the defendant in the complaint by
use of the definitive term "murder'' it must necessarily be
interpretated as murder in the second degree.

In fit a fl' v. Ru~~~'l. Supreme Court of Utah, 106 Ut. 116,
145 P. 2d 1003, Ju~tire "'"ade stated in part, at page 1007
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of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
"Section 103-28-1, U. C. A. 1943, defines murder as
the lawful killing of a human being with malice aforethcught. This is simply a codification of the common-law
definition of murder. The legislature did not thereby attempt to define, in its rown language, what constituted
murder at common law, but merely adopted the common-law
definition of murder, which means that we have ,also adopted
the interpretation placed thereon at common law. It is that
in 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 194, in his definition, quoted from Sir Edward Coke, he uses not only the terms used
by our statute but other terms which express our fundamental concept of the necessary elements of crime. He also
adds that malice may be expressed or implied. This statutory definition is now the accepted definition or description of murder in practically all of the states. 1 Warren
on Homicide, Sec. 63 and 64; 1 Wlharton's Criminal Law,
12th Ed., 625, Sec. 419; 2 Brill's Cyclopedia 1o;f Oriminal
Law, 1025, Sec. 614; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547. 5 S. W.
j89; People v. Davis, 8 Utah 412, 32 P. 670; People v. Halliday, 5 Utah 467, 17 P. 118. It was obviously the legislative
Jntent to merely adopt the common-law definition of murder together with the construction placed thereon by the
courts as 103-28-3, U. C. A. 1943, divide murder into two
degrees and after stating what eunstitutes murder in the
first degree it provides that "any other homicide committed
under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at common law is murder in the second degree."
Thus under the definition of the crime of murder as
defined by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, if the
Defendant James W. Rodgers in this case, was charged
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with any crime, he was charged with the crime of second
degre·e murder in the complaint and that he was likewise
bound over to the District Court to stand trial for the offense of second degree murder and that his objections to
being tried for first degree murder were timely and should
have been granted and that the court in overruling his repeated protests acted arbitrarily and without regard to
the constitutional and statutory rights of the Defendant
and contrary thereto.

POINT II
Pertinent provisions of the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure applicable to Point II are set forth below:
77-23-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"TIME TO MOVE TO QUASH OR PLEAD. - Upon
being arraigned the defendant shall immediately, unless
the court grants him further time, either move to quash
the information or indictment, or plead thereto, or do both.
If he moves to quash, without also pleading, and the motion
is withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead."
77-23-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"MOTION TO QUASH - GROUNDS. - A motion to
quash the information or indictment shall be available only
on one or more of the follmving grounds. In the case of:
(1) Either an information or indictment:
(a) That it does not charge the defendant with the
commission of an offense.
(f) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
of offense charged or of the person of the defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
(2) An information:
(a) That an information was filed wi,thout the defendant first having had or waived a preliminary examination.
(c) That the prosecuting attorney had no authority
to file the information.
If a motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in
the information or indictment which can be cured by
amendment the court shall order the amendment to be
made and shall overrule the motion."

Article 1, Section 13, Constitution of Utah.
(Prosecuting by information or indictment in grand
jury.)
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and committment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of
the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and committment. The grand jury shall consist of
seven persons, five of whom must concur and find an indictment; but no grand jury shall be dmwn or summoned
unless in the opinion of the judge of the district public
interest demands it.
State v. Jensen, Supreme Court of Utah, 136 P. 2d
949. The court said on page 951 of the Pacific Reporter as
follows:
"Was the defendant given a preliminary hearing for
the offense of which she was convicted? If she was not
the cause must be reversed, regardless of the other
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claimed errors in the trial. That defendant cannot lawfully be tried and convicted on a charge upon which
she was not given or on which she did
not waive a preliminary hearing is elemental.
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, Sec. 13; Section 105-1-4
R. S. U. 1933; being Section 105-1-4 U. C. A. 1943;
State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P. 2d 1034; State
v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 39 P. 2d 1091; State v. Spencer,
15 Utah 149, 49 P. 302."
Quoting from page 955 :
"Since defendant was convicted of uttering a forged
instrument, and there was no such charge in the complaint, it follows defendant was not given a preliminary hearing for the offense of which she was convicted.
The cause is reversed and remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent herewith."
In State v. Pay, Supreme Court of Utah, 146 P. 300, the
defendant was charged with larceny in the complaint and
charged in the information with marking sheep with intent
to 'Steal.
"(3) It should here also be stated that, in all that
this court has said upon the right of a preliminary
examination and respecting the right to waiYe, it
shnws that the right has been regarded as a substantial one, and that it had reference to the charge preferred against the accused in the complaint. See State
v. Jensen, 3·1 Utah, 166, 96 Pac. 1085; State v. Hoben,
36 Utah, 186, 102 Pac. 1000."
Points numbered III, IV, and V insofar as they relate to
the sufficiency of the pleadings and constitutional rights
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and guarantees ·of defendant have been heretofore pres·ented in the above arguments relating to points 1 and 2.
POINT NO. VI
Point six resolves itself to the question of the sanity
or insanity of the defendant. It is contended that the defendant is insane due to the organic disease of syphilis
which has centralized in the central nervous system and
whioh, has robbed him of his ability to control his impulses or actions.
The defendant relied on the defense of insanity and
on this part see page 5, lines 4 through 24 of the transcript:

"MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, there are two preliminary matters that I think should be called to your attention. The statute requires that at least four days prior to
the commencement of the trial a written notice be served
on the District Atorney informing him of the Defendant's
intention to take advantage of the plea of insanity and
raise that question and make it an issue in the trial. The
notice was given to Mr. Bunnell by phone that we intended
to do that, and I understood that I could file the written
notice later, and I think that it can be stipulated can't it,
Mr. Bunnell?
:MR. BUNNELL: W-e have no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There can't possibly be any claim of surprise, because at the very beginning of this case it was
announced that would be the defense, so the record may
show that, if you have now filed written notice - Have
you filed it?
MR. REYNOLDS: Yes, it has been filed, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: That the State waives any claim relative to the time of its filing."
The following are pertinent provisions of the Utah
Criminal Code, to wit:
76-1-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"Who are capable of committing crime. - All persons
are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging
to the following classes:
(1) Children under the age of seven years.
(2) Children between the ages of seven years and
fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the
time of committfing the ~act charged against them they
knew its wrongfulness.
( 4) Lunatics and insane persons.
(6) Persons who commit the act charged without
being conscious thereof.
77-48-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"Insane persons not to be punished for crime. - No
person while insane shall be tried, adjudged to punishment
or punished for a public offense."

The Utah Supreme Court is committed to the propsition that the defendant in criminal cases is insane and
shall not be tried, adjudged to punishment or punished for
a public offense when the accused:
1. Did not linow the nature of his act.

2. Did not know it was wrong in the sense that such
an act wa~ condemned by morals or law; or~
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3.Was unable by reason of his mental disease to control his actions or impulses to injure or kill.
Speaking for the Court in State v. Green, Supreme
Court of Utah, 78 Ut. 580, 6 P. 2d 177, at pages 184 and
185 of the Pacific 'Reporter, Justice Hansen says:
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a criminal
act, it may reduce the degree of the offense where the
crime is divided into degrees and where a particular
intent is a necessary element of the greater degree,
and it~ may neither excuse nor mitigate the offense.
Insanity is effective in warding off or reducing punishment for crime only when it renders the person so
afflicted irresponsible or partly irresponsible. Assuming that the jury in this case found from the evidenc·e
beyond a rea:sonable doubt that the defendant shot and
killed James Green as charged in the information, he
would be entitled to an acquittal if at that time he was,
as a matter of fact, insane to such an extent that he
either (1) did not know the nature of !his act, that is,
did not know that he had a revolver, that it may be
loaded, and that, if discharged at or towards James
Green, it would probably injure or kill him; or (2) that
when he fired the shot he did not know it was wrong
in the sense that such act was condemned by morals
or law; or (3) that he was unable by reason of his mental disease to control his actions or impulses to injure
or kni James Green. If the defendant was afflicted with
a disease of the mind at the time of the alleged offense in any one or more of the three manners and to
the extent indicated, then and in such case he was not
legally responsible. In some jurisdictions a plea of in-
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sanity, to be available, must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, but such is not the law in
this state. In this jurisdiction evidence which raises
a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the
sanity of the accused at the time of the alleged offense entitles him to an acquittal."
"This oourt has not directly passed on the question
as to whether or not a person is legally responsible
where he knows the nature and quality of his act and
also knows that the act complained of is wrong, but
because of a diseased mind is unable to control his
conduct. That question was apparently not presented,
or, if presented, was not discussed, in the case of
State v. Brown, supra, and moreover Brown was
found, as a matter of law, to be insane. The doctrine
of irresistible impulse was referred to in the case of
State v. Mew1hinney_ supra, but was not determined.
In that case it was held the evidence was insufficient
to raise the question of insanity .It is the general, if
not the uniform, opinion of those who have made a
careful and scientific study of mental diseases, that
some forms of insanity are characterized by inability
of the person afflicted to choose the right and avoid
doing the wrong. In the light of such generally accepted views coming from those who are best qualified to speak on the subject, we are of the opinion that
courts are not justified in holding that, as a matter of
law, uo such form of insanity exists. or that such insanity does not render the person so afflicted legally
irresponsible. One who knows the right but because of
mental disease his will is so deranged or disordered
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that it fails to function and cannot direct or control
the acts of the person so afflicted is and should be
recognized as being legally insane. Volitional ability
to choose the right and avoid the wrong is as fundamental in the required guilty intent of one accused
of crime as is the intellectual power to discern right
from wrong and understand the nature and quality of
his acts. In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful that many courts have reached a different
conclusion."
"The only irresistible impulse recognized as a complete defense to a crime is one arising solely from a
mental disease."
It is submitted to this Court that the medical testimony concerning defendant's defense of insanity and the
state's rebuttal which appears in the transcript of the testimony at pages 219 through 280, is uncontradicted and
establishes beyond all reasonable question of a doubt that
the defendant is suffering from syphilis which has centralized inthe central nervous system and which had affected
hie mind at the time of the fatal incident to the extent
that he was so deranged and disordered that h·e could not
control his acts. The jury, for reasons best known to them,
have disregarded the undisputed and established facts and
the instructions of the Court on the question of insanity.

While it is conceeded that the appellate court wiJI
not ordinarily interfere with a verdict of the jury, it is
submitted that it is proper for it to do so where th·e verdict is clearly and papably against the weight of the evidence. It is further submitted that in this case there is a
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total lack of proof to sustain the verdict.
We quote from 5 C. J. S. page 638-639 and 655, which
sets forth the general principle applicable as follows:

"It is well settled that the verdict will be set aside
when it is clearly and papably against the great weight
of the evidence, where there is a total lack of proof
to sustain the verdict, where the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the verdict, where there is a
strong preponderence of evidence over that on which
the verdict is based, and it appears that injustice has
been done or where manifest injustice thereof shows
mistake, prejudice, sympathy, corruption, or other
improper motive on the part of the jury, or where the
verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence as
to shock the ordinary fair minded person."
In support of defendant Rodgers' argument that the
jury rendered a verdict contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence with respect to the question of the sanity
of the defendant, we assume that the Court will examine
all of the medical testimony in detail. However, for the
purpose of emphasizing such testimony, we take the liberty
of quoting extensively from the testimony of the witnesses
with respect to the .question of the sanity of the Defendant.
Dr. Chester B. Powell, an l\1. D. specializing in the
field o,f neurology and neurosurgery, testified on behalf of
the Defendant to the effect that the Defendant had syphilis
of tfte central nervous system, that is, the brain and spinal
cord. The significant portions of the testimony of Dr. Pow·
ell are set forth below. beginning at page 220 et seq
of the transcript of the trial:
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"Q. Now, Doctor, do you know the Defenrant, James

Rogers?
A. Yes I had occasion to examine him on December
3, 1957.
Q. Now, Doctor, what did this examination include?

A. I took a history from the patient. Including any
symptoms he might have. I discussed his background with
respect to diseases, illnesses. The family from which he
came. I tf.en examined him with particular reference to the
nervous ::ystem. Which is a rather detailed examination
including bhe test of the eyes and of the various nerves that
come off the brain. The extension movement, patient coordination. Reflexes when we tap with the hammer. I
checked his sensation in various forms like touch, pain,
vibraUon, so :forth. And had him walk. Examined his posture and gait. Sense of balance. Looked for special signs.
And then finally did a brain wave test on him.
Q. Now, Doctor, in your practice have you had exper-

ience with persons who have had syphHis of the nervous
system?
A. Yes.
Q. Now in connection with your examination of this
Defendant and assuming the fact, Dr. Powell, that there
had been two positive serologies of the sprinal fluid of this
Defendant, do you have an opinion of what that indicates?

A. Yes, the indicatlion is syphilitic infection.
Q. Now, Doctor, assuming also the fact that there
have been two serologies of the Defendant's blood which
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were negative, what would that indicate to you in relationship to the positive spinal serology?
A. Well in most cases where there is a syphilitic infection somewhere in the body the blood test is positive in
some degree. It often is positive in the spinal fluid. Now if
there is an infection in the nervous system itself, that is to
say, the brain or the spinal cord, then in most instances
the spinal fluid also shows a positive serology. However,
this isn't a hundred percent the case. In about ninety five
to ninety-seven percent of patients infected with syphilis
in the nervous sy·stem the spinal fluid serology is positive.
And in some .three to five percent of the cases it may be
negative. The blood likewise is not a hundred percent positive when, particularly when the syphilitic infection is in
the nervous sy·stem. About three percent on the average
o1 patients with syphilis of the nervous system will show
a negative blood serology.
If neither blood or spinal fluid serology is positive,
then the diagnosis of syphilis can be made, but it has to
be made on other grounds. And it is a rather difficult and
suspecting diagnosis in that instance. But if one or the otlher
serology, blood or spinal fliud, is positive then the, that
alone presents the presumptive diagnosis of syphilis.
Q. With respect to this Defendant, Mr. Rodgers, is the
diagno'Sis a strong or weak diagnosis?

A. The diagnosis of syphilis in this instance depends
on the sp·inal fluid serology. I have considered that in his
case since we have a question posed by the fact that his
blood serology is negative. And also by the fact that he
doesn't have any prominent clinical signs of syphilis. In
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other words, when we examined lhim we don't find .the
usual changes in the reflexes and the coordination and so
forth that we might expect to find in some degree. So I
was particularly concerned about the diagnosis.
Now there are other possibilities of known, known to
occur which are quite rare, and which other factors can produce a positive syphilitic reaction. It is called a false positive. In other words, you get the reaction but it doesn't
mean what it says.
Q. Well now may I interrupt, Doctor. Are tlhose occa·sions of rfalse positive common?

A. No, they are exceedingly rare. And they may occur
under certain circumstances such as the following: In this
country most often we see it happen when a patient has a
brain tumor which causes a secretion of protein into tlhe
spinal fluid, and in very rare instances when the protein
is quite high this may produce a false positive.
In the tropics there are certain tropical diseases which
are infrequent and do not occur in this climate which can
also produce a false positive reaction.
There is also an acute infection of the lymph glands
of the body and tlh'is disease occurs in this country, which
has been reported on rare instances to cause a false positive.
Now because of the lack of a positive blood serology
I wondered in this instance in this patient whether the positive serology in the spinal fluid could be so-called false pos~
tive. So I considered his findings, and he does not have, neither by examination or by the brain wave, any evidence of
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brain tumor. And, furthermore, his spinal fluid protein is
normal. Secondly, he has no signs of this lymph gland
disease. Thirdly, he has no signs, and there is no basis
for making any diagnosis of a tropical disease. So there is
no evidence whatever to suspect tihat the positive ·serology
is a so-called false positive. The only conclusion that I can
come to then is that this reaction which is a standard diagnostic test, highly reliable, used tlhroughout the world,
means that this man has an infection with syphilis and
specifically in the nervous system.
Q. Now, Doctor, when you say in the nervous sy·stem,
does tfue fact that it is taken from spinal fluid have any
particular significance?

A. In what respect?
Q. Well, what are the vital organs of the nervous sys-

tem?
A. We divide the nervous system in two major parts.
The central nervous system which is the brain and spinal
cord, and the nerves constitute the otber part. The nerves
in the arms and legs. Throughout the body. The spinal
fluid is associated with the central nervous system. Produced in the brain, circulates through the brain, around
the brain and down the spinal canal. So when we encounter
an infection of the nervous system such as syphilis the evidence of that infection is found in tlhe spinal fluid.
Q. Now when one has syphilis of the brain and the

spinal cord, what is the effect on the brain and spinal cord?
A. This i~ a loaded question.
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Q. Perhaps I shouldn't have asked it, but try please.

A. Almost any, any symptoms having to do with the
nervous system and almost any signs we see in the way of
weakness or change of sensation, change of reflexes, in
coordination, mental changes, paralysis, almost any change
that reflects s•omebhing wrong in the nervous system can
be caused by syphilis. It has been called the great imitator
because it can simulate so many other diseases. So the medical profession from time immemorial has been alerted to
suspect this condition and keep a watchful eye for it because it may appear in so many guises.
Q. Now - Pardon me

A. Let meQ. Go right aihead.

A. Let me go a little further. I can just enumerate
briefly some of the varities of disordor that syphilis in the
nervous system causes. In the acute infection it causes an
acute inflamation of the brain and spinal cord. And the
covering. It may, in fact, produce a meningitis like spinal
meningitis. Later on it produces scarring in the tissue.
And tlhis scar may affect predominantly the brain or predominantly the spinal cord, or predominantly the blood vessels in the brain, and depending on which area is involved
the symptoms will vary. If it involves the brain it will affect the functions of the brain. And it will produce symptoms like a headadhe. Loss of memory. Any mental symptoms. Impairing of thinking, vision. Impairment of vision
or hearing. Impairment of speech, and produces mental
changes and very comm·only does as it progresses. In the
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spinal cord it produces usually weakness in the extremeties
and loss of coordination. With impairrnent of gait, loss of
balance. When it affects the blood vessels of tlhe nervous
system it usually produces some indication of both brain
and spinal cord symptoms. Any of these infections, any of
these localizations of the infection will produce usually
a positive serology both in the blood and the spinal fluid.
Q. With respect to the mental changes which this disease causes, would you explain to the Court and Jury please
what some of those are?

A. In the same way that syphilis can simulate other
organic diseases like brain tumor and injury, it can also
simulate mental disease itself. In other words, mental
changes tJhat are associated with syphilitic infection of the
brain can duplicate other types of mental disease. But most
often it produces changes in the realm of thinking. "\Vhich
result in what we call delusions.
Delusions are false beliefs. The person is deluded. He
may believe he is the President of the United States. Or
God. That is a false belief. But in his mind that is the truth
so far as he is concerned. The delusions that are characteristic of syPhilitic infection of the nervous system take on
a variety of patterns. Usually they are ideas of grandeur,
in which a person will feel that he is important, that he
has great powers. He will identify himself as the President,
as a general, for instance. And \·ery often lbe is either God
or Jesus or someone else of great religious significance.
The other type of delusion apart from grandeur and
expansiveness includes things like feeling that they have
grPat wealth. Feeling that they can control people's actions.
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And then anotJher large set of delusions are what the doctors call ideas of reference in which the patient refers
ev,erything to himself. In terms of himself. If he sees a
policeman coming down the street lhe is apt to think, well
I better get out of here because this policeman is obviously
after me. In other words, he doesn't have the normal reaction, well there goes John or there goes a cop. But he references the policeman and the situation to him.self. These
ideas of reference may take a pattern of fear, or they may
take the pattern, and this is a very common group called
paranoid. In which these ideas of reference in the patient's
mind imply a threat. These, many such patients are the
ones you read about in the papers who suddenly kill someone else and afterward they say, well I was threatened.
These are the dangerous lunatics. They are the ones if we
can recognize them beforehand are the ones that are committed to the State Hospital and often have to be put into
confinement because they are the individuals who feel that
Russia, the Russians are after them or their wife or their
husband is after them, that all the policemen are after tihem.
All the ideas of reference apply to themselves and imply a
threat and they are very unhappy people because they are
so terribly endangered. And tlhese are the ones that because
of this danger that their delusions tell them they are threatened with, they have to protect themselves and this often
means fighting or committing some violent act to ward
off the threat."
Q. I see. Of course, Doctor, even if we as,sume that he

has syphilis of the, at least that the test showed a positive
in his spinal fluid, we don't know that the central nervous
system or brain has been affected at all do we?
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A. The implication of the positive serology in the
spinal fluid is assuming that it is not a false positive?
Q. Yes.

A. There is infection in the nervous system. Syphilitic
infection of the nervous system, and I think that with that,
that that implication is unaltered by the fact that there
were no clinical signs or brain wave changes."
"Q. Doctor, are these psychiatric examinations and
psychological examinations a part of the, tlhe examinations
normally employed in diagnosis of syphilis of the brain?
A. Would you restate your question?
(Question read by reporter.)
A. Yes. Psychological tests are very important because very often the psychologic tests provide the basis
for the clinical diagnosis of central nervous system involvement."
Dr. John Landward appeared on behalf of the Defendant to testify as a clinical psychologist. An exmaination of
the transcript will demonstrate the qualifications of Dr.
Landward. Dr. Landward's testimony is most significant
because of the fact that his examination shows to have
been conducted without reference to any history of the
beha \'im· of the defendant and designed primarily to accomplish an analysis of the mental condition of the De·
fendant by use of objective tests. The testimony of Dr.
Landward eloquently demonstrated the discovery of organic
mental disorder and we quote extensively from the testi·
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mony of Dr. Landward as follows, beginning at page 2312
et seq of the transcript, to wit:
"Q. Now how would you define or classify mental

disorder?
A. Well there are two general broad classifications.
One you call the organic and having to do with the, primarily the physical aspect and the functional that has prima·rily to do with the emotional and personal aspect.
Q. Would you define the organic type?

A. The organic has to do primarily with the, what we
call the neurological or the nervous system and this has to
do with various kinds of damage to the nervous system.
Particularly the central neTvous system and damage being
caused by various agents such as disease, encephalitis,
syphilis, poison, physical damage, and so on. Is that what
you had in mind?
Q. Yes, thank you. On the other hand, how would you
define the functional type disorder?

A. The functional type primarily has to do with the
influences of the environment upon the person, and how
this molds the person into the kind of person he is. His
basic attitude. His viewpoint or what you might call his
life style. Style of life.
Q. Is there any relationship between the functional
type mental disorder and the organic type meu.t.al disorder?

A. Yes. You can't separate the phy,sical ,from the person because they are inter-related. We have to use them
both. And very frequently damage to the physical affects
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the personal attributes and expressions and manifestations
of the person. And likewise in reverse."
Q. Now in your examination of the subject What procedures do you use to determine if there are any indications
of an organic disorder?

MlR. BUNNELL: Your Honor, I think that I will object to this unless we can tie it in with this case some way.
The general procedures he uses in organic disorders, can't
we tie it down to this Defendant and get on with it?
THE COURT: Well I don't know myself. He is laying
a foundation for some other judgement, so he may proceed.
I can't tell as yet.
A. Well the, my, as I would see it my primary involvement in the situation was to give the Defendant some psychological tests. Which is one of the primary functions of
tfue clinical psychologists and psychiatrists determination,
and the tests that I used in regard to the Defendant are the
following: What we call the Wexler Adult Intelligence
Scale. Rorscach Ink Blot Test. The Bender-Gesthalt Motor
Test. The Schematic Apperception Test, and a Sentence
Completion Test. Now the way that you asked the question
I think I should charify this. That I, when I tested the Defendant I had no notion that this man might have some
organic involvement. I was merely giving him a battery of
tests to evaluate him as a person, his viewpoint, attitude,
function, intellectual function and so on.
Q. Pardon me, Doctor, on what day was that examina-

tion conducted by you?
A. November 23, 1957.
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Q. Now with respect to each of the examinations that

you gave the Defendant would you explain the nature of the
examination and the result if you will please?
A. Well I usually give these tests in a certain sequence.
I am accustomed to it. The very first test that I gave to
the Defendant was this Bender-Gesthalt Motor Test. This
is composed of some cards, eight cards on which there are
some rather simple figures. And the test is for the person
who takes the test to copy these figures. I present them to
him one at a time, and the instructions are, "You copy this
on a blank sheet of paper the best way that you can." Those
are all the instructions that I give to the person who takes
the test.
And as he finishes one ,figure, copying or drawing the
figure as he sees it on the card I present, I withdraw that
card and present the next one. So on through the sequence
of these cards. Now it is generally well known that individuals who suffer some damage, physical neurological damage, this shows up in their physical coordination and so on.
And though this may appear to be a rather simple thing,
what we call eye-hand coordination, we learn this as we grow
up so we just take these things for granted; but when some
of the nerves are damaged then this comes up, and we notice
people not being able to reproduce these particular figures
accurately. And there are two or three of these particular
figures which we know from studies that have been made,
psychological experiments that have been made with the
brain damaged people, particularly what we call a figure
grr und kind of operation, intellectual operation which involves expression of this, or through the use of the muscles
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tha1 in, people these processes of clearly seeing the figure
and ground, and I don't know how to express this, but when
he nets used to say this scenic country out here and you
get to seeing things you get accustomed to seeing things
in certain locations. And if something happens to you they
look kind of odd to you and funny to you and this is just
on tre area of perception, but when you attempt to repro?uce the things with muscles this is difficult, and particularly this one figure in my experience with these kind of
people they have difficulty in what we call the overlapping
figures on that one card. And in the Defendant's case, as I
say, I ha \l no notion of what, as far as I was concerned this
was goint' to be an evalution of him as a person, and I give
this test routinely. Pick up any clues that I might look for
in the rest of the battery of the tests that I give to these individuals. And I noticed that on this particular card that
this man had a good bit of difficulty of reproducing these
overlapping figures. I asked him to try it again. He did so
and went through the exact process. He acknowledged his
difficulty. I don't recall exactly what he said, but some difficulty he recognized of drawing this thing the way it was
done by people who don't have this kind of difficulty.
Q. Wlhat did you conclude from that inability?

A. I concluded then on some of the other tests that I
gave that I would then examine this particular, what I perceived as an impairment or disfunction, and see if I would
be able to discern this as I went along through the other
tests of, that also are sensitive to brain damage. Should I
go on and tell what these are?
Q. Let me ask you

thi~

question first. Did you make any
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recommendation with respect to this impairment?
A. You mean at the conclusion of my examination? Yes.
Q. Yes.

A. Yes I did. I suggested tlhat this man be examined
further by other clinical procedures. Particularly procedures that are used by neurologists. I didn't specify, I left
that up to the person that you might refer the Defendant
to. Ordinarily I think, I think when I talked to you, I think
I at least mentioned that he get an E. E. G.
Q. Now what did then your examination include other

than that matter you told us about?
A. It included these other tests that I mentioned that
I used in the battery. The Wexler Bellview Adult Intelligence Scale is a test that is widely used throughout the
country in hospitals and clinics for evaluation of intellectual performance. There are two or three of these what we
call sub-tests. And are tests that are used to detect any
brain damage impairment. One of these is what we call the
block design test. This is made up of nine little blocks that
are colored white and red and they have a white side, a
red side and half of them, some of them have a half red
and white. A person who takes this particular test, we have
some designs which we present to them and ask them then
to take these blocks and to put these 'blocks together so
that they come out with the design matching the one on
the card that we give them. Now to the extent that they
find difficulty in doing this, of course, we have tb inquire
as to what their problem was, how they perceived this. If
they seem to be puzzled or did it wrong, then of course we
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have to inquire and find out what the particular problem is.
And again, in people who have brain damage they have a
feeling or idea that they know how to do it but just can't
quite fit it together, and this again is what we call a sort of
impetence. This is one of the technical terms that we use,
but it is used in the sense that a person has a sense of knowing what needs to be done, but not being able to do it. And
Mr. Rodgers on this particular test had difficulty on again
one of tlhese designs that is particularly sensitive to people
who have brain damage. Now this was my second corroborative bit of evidence that I picked up from the previous
test.
Q. Then what did you do next in your examination?

A. Then I go to the ink blot test whic'h consists of ten
cards on which there are some designs again. I have these
thing with me if you want me to show the people.
Q. You might demonstrate this one, Doctor.

A. These are the ten blocks. They are just made from
ink blot designs. The man who worked with this technique
was a man by the name of Rorscach. He was a Swiss psychiatrist and that is why it is called Rorscach, after Dr.
Rorscach. And he used these to have people look at and
then tell him what he thought they saw in them or imagined they could look like or resemble and so on. And this
is again one of the standard techniques that we use to examine people, mentally disturbed, emotionally disturbed
people. And from it we get some pretty clear ideas. Sort
of a quick cross section of how they react to stimulus and
environment, social, psychological situations.
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Q. Now with respect to the Defendant-

A. And in this - I was coming to that. Again in this
test a person with brain damage shows up particular difficulty. Again it is the same kind of difficulty that you pick
up in the block design test. The difficulty in pulling together in the Whole sense, what we call an integrated sense, a
particular image that appears to him that he formulates in
his mind and tell me what he sees there. This is particularly
true in people of w'hat I call good intelligence.
Now I haven't mentioned this, and you haven't asked
me for it, but I will state it here. Mr. Hodger'3 is a person
with what we vwuld, a person with intelligence. In the
I. Q. tests he had an average I. Q. test of 122 Which places
him in what we call the superior intelectual group. On some
of the sub tests that I, have to do with abstract reason, he
was wlhat we call a very superior level of intelligence, coming out with an I. Q. of 132. So these kind of people who
have this level of intelligence, coming out with rather simple concrete kinds of ideas, together with the other evidence
that I had accumulated in the other two tests, in my experience this again is another evidence to me that tlhis man is
not living up to or expressing his potentialities, and the
number of cases that I have seen usually have been substantiated as having some kind of brain disfunction or
brain damage.
Q. Was that indicated by t 1he result of Mr. Rodgers test

on this Rorscach Test?
A. Yes. Perhaps I didn't make that clear. But again I
· used this as an, another bit of evidence from the total bat-
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tery of tests that this is What this should be interpreted
in my experience.
Q. Now, Doctor, what is the relationship between intelligence and high I. Q. and mental disorders?
A. Well, quite a relationship. We know that people with
high I. Q.'s usually come out with certain kinds of mental
disorders rather than others. For example, people with
high I. Q.'s when they get, if there are mental disturbances
and so on are likely to come out with, oh, what we could call
paranoid stages, paranoid conditions. And so on. That is,
if they are disturbed. There are groups of mental conditions,
but this is one that frequently you see with people with high
I. Q.'s.
Q. Doctor, now with reference to your examination of
the Defendant, Mr. Rodgers, do you have an opinion of his
mental condition?
A. You mean now?
Q. Yes.
A. You mean as a result of my examination? Yes.
Q. Yes
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. What is the opinion, your opinion?
A. My opinion is that Mr. Rodgers is an emotionally,
mentally, intellectually, disturbed person. I see him as a person who, because of the environment, environmental situation and the stress of ~is particular environment grew up
with I think, as I would see it, a distorted viewpoint about
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people and about life situations that involved people. And
the distorted viewpoint as I would see it comes out generally as being a rather distrustful person. A suspicious person, one I think Who would tend generally to misunderstand
and misinterpret the intentions and motives of people in
regard to himself as a person. He would be easily threatened by individuals because of his, of his, of his very sensitive nature in regard to how people treat him. And I think,
it would be my conclusion from tihe test materials and test
data would, would lead me certainly to the opinion that it
would be difficult for him, certainly under stress, to accurately evaluate the nature of things going on about him.
Particularly when these are threatening to him and the
picture of himself that he has to maintain to feel adequate
as a person.
Q. Doctor, in your opinion does the Defendant suffer

from delusions.?
A. I think he could under stress. Well I would say delusions in the sense as I understand them, that under stress
he would not accurately perceive the nature of the situation as it affected him in the way that he would feel that
he would have to maintain hims·elf and his integrity with
himself. I think because of his sensitivity in relationship
to people that he would more likely perceive things inaccurately under stressful situations and the meaning of that
situation than the ordinary person would.
Q. How would you define the mental condition of the
Defendant?

A. You mean the label that we, I would give to it?
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Q. Yes.

A. I defined it in my report as primarily egoid character disorder with strong paranoid tendencies. Do you
want me to tell you what I think that means?
Q. I'm afraid I will have to ask you what tlhat means

now.
A. All right. To me egoid character disorder is a person
who has rather detached relationships with people. There
is a certain amount of aloofness, a certain amount of distance that they place between people. They may be friendly,
but you never feel that you get hold of these people as a person. They live around people, but they are not with people.
They are not part of the community or the social life. And
this is what I have in mind, sort of a detached, isolated kind
of person.
Now the paranoid condition as I understand that can
best be explained as I understad it as a certain suspiciousness about t'he intentions and motives of people toward
them. Feeling in a sense that there is always, particularly
if you are challenged, that you have got to prove yourself.
And so on. Sometimes it comes out in grandiose ways. They
may say things, boast about things that tlhey have done
that they may not have done and begin to believe perhaps
that they have done in order to build up this picture of
themselves that is important to them because of their very
strong feeling of being inadequate as a person.''
"Q. Assuming then, Dr. Landward, that the Defendant

has had a positive serology on two spinal tests, one a two
plus and one a three plus, would that affect in any way
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your opinion as to his mental condition?
A. Well I would assume that some disease process certainly is involved.
Q. Would this have any relation?

A. To the extent that this is one of the, classified under
brain syndromes classifications of mental disturbances and
mental disorders. T·hen I would have to accept that as indicating some degree of brain damage. And this certainly
would make me feel that the things that I picked up on my
psychological tests could be explained in this way. If there
weren't any other history of some other brain damage by
blows on the head or excessive alcohol or a number of other
things that can bring about brain damage.
Q. Did your examination disclose any cause of brain
damage?

A. No, it can't do that. It is not designed to do that. It
is merely designed to detect brain damage in t 1he intellectual and muscular cyclomotor functions of the individual.
Q. Now, Doctor, I have a hypothetical question to pose
to you. It is rather lengthy. Doctor, please assume these

to be a fact. That this man Rodgers that you 11ave examined
was working at the Rattle Snake Mine in San Juan County
for a period of about eight months up and to June 19, 1957;
that on one occasion during that period he struck a coworker named Dee Gardner several times over an altercation concerning the loading of a truck. In addition to t1~1:1t
he had an altercation with another man named Bobby
Goodnight which was a disagreement arising over the
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dumping of some ore. That Rodgers apologized to this fellow
Goodnight. Goodnight accepted his apology with the remark as follows, "I accept your apology but I will never
forget it." That the Defendant Rodgers bragged and exaggerated before his fellow workers, and he was therefore
teased and ribbed, perhaps no worse than others on the job
were teased and ribbed. That approximately nineteen days,
that is around June 1st of 1957, Mr. Rodgers had an altercation with tlhe Deceased, Mr. Merrifield, and that at that
time Mr. Merrifield accused Mr. Rodgers of not performing
some of his tluties. And in the ensuing agrument that the
Deceased, Mr. Merrifield, called Mr. Rodgers a damned liar.
And that on the 18th of June of this year the Defendant
related a story to one Tommy Thompson to the effect that
he, Rodgers, had heard that Merrifield was going to pick a
beef with Rodgers and that Rodgers stated that if so he
would be ready for Merrifield. And then assume that on the
19th day of June, 1957, that the Defendant Rodgers was
working in the mine pit with several other employees and
that the Deceased, Charles Merrifield, remarked to two other employees, "You better get off your ass or I'll 1Jell Boss
Rodgers." That Rodgers overheard this remark and stated
to Dennis Ingraham, another fellow worker, that he was
going to have to kill Merrifield. And that he was going to
get his gun. That Rodgers left the pit and came back with
the gun in his belt. That he 'valked over to within twentyfive feet of where the Deceased was loading trucks with
a power shovel. That Rodgers waited until Merrifield had
loaded a truck, whereupon Rodgers fired a shot into the
ground. Merrifield rose from his seat on the shovel and as
he was getting off t'he shovel Rodgers shot Merrifield sevSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eral times. Rodgers claims Merrifield attacked him with a
large wrench. No wrench has been found. Upon leaving the
pit, Rodgers stated to a co-worker, "He asked for it and
he got it." Rodgers fled the scene and was apprehended
peacefully in Cortez, Colorado. Now as,suming tlhose facts,
Dr. Landward, do you have an opinion ·of the mental condition of Mr. Rodgers at the time of the shooting incident?
A. Yes, I could give you one.
Q. Would you please.

A. The way I would understand the nature of Mr.
Rodgers as a person, the way he would be sensitive about
himself as a person in relationship to other people, the very
strong need to maintain himself as an adequate person,
under circumstances that would be challenging to him with
his distorted, as I would see it, his distorted viewpoint and
attitude about people and how they treat him, I believe
that over a period of time he could become so vexed that
he would have no other choice in his own mind to do w'hat
he did to defend himself.
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor Landward, concern-

ing the ability of the Defendant, Mr. Rodgers to control
his actions and impulses on the occasion of the shooting?
A. Well I think I have implied that.
MR. BUNNELL: Your Honor, I will object to that
unless he says on the occasion stated in the hypothetical
question.
A. Will you state that again then?
THE COURT: The hypothetical question'?
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A. No, no, I have that in mind, but the question in
terms of the hypothetical question.
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, whether at the
time of the shooting as related in the hypothetical question
the Defendant was in such a condition as to be able to control his actions and impulses?

A. Well like, I should say again I t'hink I implied that
in my previous answer. And it is this, that I do not believe
that within himself he felt that he had any other choice
to do than what he did, and to this ex~nt I do not believe
that he was 3ible to control what he did. Oher than to do
what lhe determined he had to do to maintain his safety.
Q. Now is that what you could call a delusion?

A. To the extent that he was unable to accurately interpret and perceive the nature of the threat to him which
he apparently perceived as being threatening to him as
a person and as a, his physical safety as well.
Q. In light of t'he hypothetical question propounded to

youA. Let me put it this way to you. Any time there is
a misinterpretation or exaggeration of what is happening
to us, well, again to Mr. Rodgers to make it specific. And
I see him being unable to accurately perceive phenomena
or social situations or circumstances that he has always
seen as threatening to himself. Therefore, he would tend to
exaggerate the nature of the threat. This would be very
rea.I to him. To us, to myself, seeing this, yes you could label
thi::; aR a delusion, but it was not reality.
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Q. Would that be in your opinion then, Doctor, considered to be an irresistable impulse?

A. Yes, he had no other choice."
A. Well I tell you this,, that I started with Mr. Rodgers
from scatch. As far as the examination was concerned I,
all I knew was that he was on trial, but any of his background, any of his personal history was not given to me,
and I made no inquiry regrding it while he was there. While
I examined him.
Q. Did you inquire of him regarding the incident on
June 19th?

A. He volunteered this information. I did not inquire.
And as far as I am concerned I didn't include this in terms
of the interpretation of my test data. My report and my
opinion is based primarily on my test data."
Dr. C. Craig Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant
as a medical doctor, specializing in psychiatry. It is significant to point out to the Court that at the time of the
arraignment of the Defendant, Dr. Craig Nelson was
chosen by the District Judge, F. W. Keller, as one of the
alienists to examine into the sanity of the Defendant and
for some reason unknown to the Defendant, Dr. Craig Nelson was unable to conduct the examination until he was requested to do so on behalf of the Defendant by Defendant's
Counsel herein. Dr. Craig Nelson's testimony in this matter
clearly demonstrates that the Defendant was suffering from
syphilis of the brain and spinal cord and that this organic
defect coupled with a functional mental disorder caused a
severe mental disorder in the Defendant characterized by
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Dr. Nelson as paranoid with psychotic delusions. Dr. Nelson's testimony most significantly demonstrates the mental
condition of the Defendant at the time of the fatal incident
and, we think, stands uncontradicted. Accordingly, we quote
from the transcript of the trial and Dr. Nelson's testimony
is as follows:

"MR. REYNOLDS: May we proceed?
CRAIG NELSON, the witness on the stand at the time of
taking recess, resumed the stand for further examination
as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. REYNOLDS:
Q. Doctor, assume the fact that the Defendant has
had two spinal fluid tests and that the results of these show,
the first one shows a three plus and the second one shows
a two plus. Assuming that fact in connection with your examination of the Defendant do you have an opinion concerning his mental condition?

A. My opinion would be that ihe is suffering from central nervous system infection of lues or syphilis.
Q. You base that opinion on medical indications of the

two plus and three plus separate and apart from the psychiatric examination?
A. I base it on the composite of all of them together.
My examination plus the laboratory findings.
Q. Then I will withdraw that question. Would you explain to the Court and Jury, Doctor, what lues of the central nervous system means?
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son's body by the organism that caused it. And the infection travels to the brain and the spinal cord and the, there
has been an actual infection of ·the structures of the brain
and spinal cord. That this then, on the basis of an organic
basis, there has been a definite change t 1hen in the tissue
and this then affects the way a person thinks and acts and
feels"
Q. Now with respect to the type of mental disorder, how
do you classify it?

A. We are speaking still just of the luetic infection?
This is an organic brain condition. This is an infectious
organic brain condition, but if we take in the additional
facts that came out of my examination then I would say
this of, this has brought about a specific functional state,
a paranoid state in the individual. That is, this plus all of
the effects of his past.
Q. Now will you explain what are the charactistics of
this type of paranoid condition?

A. A paranoid condition is one where there is an abnormal, unusually large amount of suspicion, or jealously.
Of, there is a grandiose or bragging kind of nature to an
individual. These are all of an abnormal and unusually large
component. The person is inclined to be, to keep his feelings to himself up to a point, but then he can contain t'hem
no longer and there is often a discharge of these feelings,
an action, a very impulsive action.
Q. Now does this type of person suffer from feelings

of persecution?
A. Yes. This would be in the area of the suspiciousness
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and jealousy. Where there is always a feeling that people
pick on or plan against or do things to hurt an individual.
To hurt them.
Q. Did the Defendant display these feelings and attitudes to you?

A. Yes. I, in my examination I felt that he regularly
described in relationships with several people that he came
in contact with this feeling he was picked on or pushed
around or ridiculed. He felt very much the same in regard
to three people. Each time he would handle it in the same
way. Kind of repetitious way. Where he felt, where first
of all he would deny that 1he was jealous or that he cared,
but then all of the feelings would suddenly come out and he
was compelled to act with each of these three people in
suclh a way as to provoke a fight or attempt to provoke a
fight, or, in one instance that led to the shooting.
Q. Doctor, is that what you call systematization?

A. Yes, this is systematization in this, in the sense tllat
it is repeated over and over again. The same pattern where
he feels that someone is pushing him, out to get ihim, belittling him. He takes it as long as he can, doesn't let little
bits of feeling out the way most people do, but then is compelled to erupt to get this feeling out.
Q. Is this true though in fact the reality doesn't sup-

port it, these feelings?
A. That's right.
Q. Now did the Defendant exhibit to you any delusions?
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cribed in terms of eac'h of these fights and the shooting he
was acting on a delusion that he had to either defend his
honor, his self esteem or his personal body.
Q. In your opinion would that be a psychotic delusion?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, Doctor, I am going to propound a hypotheti-

cal question to you, and I want you to assume these facts in
connection with your diagnosis of the Defendant. Assume
that this man Rodgers was working at the Rattle Snake
Mine 'here in San Juan County for a period of about eight
months up until the 19th of June, 1957. And that on one occasion he had an altercation with a man by the name of
Dee Gardner concerning the manner in which a truck should
be loaded and that as a result of that the Defendant struck
Dee Gardner about three times. Now assume also that on
another occasion he had an altercation wit'h a fellow by
the name of Bobby Goodnight and that this arose out of a
disagreement concerning the dumping of ore. And that
Rodgers apologized for t'his and in response Goodnight accepted his apology and said, "I will accept your apology
but I will never forget it." Assume that Rodgers bragged
and exaggerated before his fellow workers and that he
therefore was teased and ribbed and perhaps to no more
extent than the other men on the job were also teased and
ribbed. And assume that about on June the 1st, 1957, that
t'he Defendant had an altercation with the Deceased, Charle8
Merrifield, and that the Deceased accused the Defendant
of not performing his duties and an argument ensued and
that the Deceased, Merrifield, called Rodgers a damned liar.
And then assume on the 19th, or t'he 18th day of June
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1957, that the Defendant related to a man by the name of
Tommy Thompson that he, Rodgers, had heard that Merrifield was going to pick a beef with him before Merrifield
left the job. And that if he did Rodgers would be ready for
him. And then further assume that on the 19th day of
Jun·e 1957, that the Defendant was working in this mine
pit with other employees and that Charles Merrifield remarked to two other employees as follows, "You better get
off your ass or I'll tell Boss Rodgers." That Rodgers overheard this remark and stated to Dennis Ingrahm, another
worker, that he was going to have to kill Merrifield before
Merrifield left. And that he would also have to get his gun
That Rodgers left the pit and came back with the gun in
his belt. That he walked over to within twenty-five feet of
where the Deceased, Mrrifield, was loading trucks with a
power shovel. And that Rodgers waited until Merrifield
had completed loading one of these trucks and then he shot
into the ground. That Merrifield rose from his seat on the
shovel and as Merrifield was getting off Rodgers shot Merrifield several times. Rodgers claims Merrifield attached
him with a large wrench. No wrench has been found. Upon
leaving this pit after the shooting Rodgers stated to a fellow worker, "He asked for it and he got it.'' Rodgers fled
the scene and was apprehended peacably in Cortez, Colorado.
Now, Doctor, assuming those facts, do you have an
opinion concerning the mental condition of the Defendant
at the time of the shooting as it wa~ recited in the hypothetical question?
A. Yes. My opinion is that Mr. Rodgers was suffering
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from central nervous system lues. Was suffering from a
paranoid condition. Was psychotic and acted in a compulsive manner were he driven 'from within, had to carry out
this action against the Deceased.
Q. At the tbne of the shooting as related in this hy·

pathetical question, do you have an opinion concerning
whether the Defendant had any control over his actions
or impulses?
A. I feel that he, all of his control was taken from him
in terms of the organic lues change, and on the basis of
this compulsion to shoot this man.
Q. Was the Defendant at that time acting under an ir-

restible impulse?
A. Yes. An irrestible impulse. It was a delusional system
that impelled him. That made that an irrestible act.
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether or not
the mental condition of the Defendant led to or was the
cause of the shooting?

A. Yes. I feel it was the mental condition of Mr. Rodgers that led to the shooting as it was, well it came about
through the usual routine of his life. Usual amounts of kidding or whatever happened. This came from within him.
This was a sickness from within."
"A. It means that he has an organic condition.
Q. Of course, Doctor, the fact that he is and has as

you say or at least in your opinion that he has paranoid
tendencies doesn't necessarily mean that he doesn't know
the difference between right and wrong does it?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

74
A. No. And I didn't indicate. I think that he does know
the difference between right and wrong, but that he acted
from a compulsion.
Q. Well, does the fact that he is a paranoid necessarily
mean that he has to act under compulsion all the time?

A. Yes.
Q. You say that definitely, yes?

A. Yes.
Q. Do all paranoids act under compulsion all the time?

A. All paranoids are acting on a delusional system. Their
actions are governed. This is an abnormal condition and
their actions are governed."
"Q. Doctor, you stated that the Defendant in your opinion is paranoid with psychotic delusions, is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. Is that a mild or severe condition?

A. I think it is always a severe condition.
Q. Is the Defendant's case severe?

A. Yes.
Q. Also you have referred to something called lues. Is

that the same as syphilis?
A. That is syphilis.
The State called as a rebuttal witness to the evidence
offered by the Defendant on the question to the Defendant's
sanity, Dr. William D. Pace, who had examined the Defend·
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ant on behalf of the State. With the rexception of the testimony by Dr. Pace with reference to his qualification as
an expert, we quote the entire tes,timony given by Dr. Pace
for the purpose of demonstrating that to the· extent of the
examination made by him, no conflict exists between his
testimony and the testimony of the Witnesses testifying
on behalf of the Defendant with respect to the question of
the Defendant's sanity. We believe that the testimony of
Dr. Pace patently shows that his examination was perfunctory, superficial and without sufficient inquiry into the
condition of the Defendant, and without any inquiry into
the possibility o.f an organic mental disease. Beginning at
page 270, line 29 of the transcript, we quote as follows:
"Q. Do you, Doctor, do you know the Defendant in this
case, James W. Rodgers?

A. Yes I do.
Q. And have you ever had an occasion to make an examination of him?

A. Yes.
Q. When did that examination take place?

A. That took place on the 8th and 9th of September
in Salt Lake City.
Q. And about how long did you spend with him on each
of those days, September 8th and 9th?

A. Approximately an hour each day.
Q. And what was the nature of your examination,

Doctor?
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A. I made a psychiatric examination. An interview type
of examination, asking questions regarding his history,
family history. His personal history, medical history, that
sort of thing. And also asking certain questions for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of his mental condition.
Q. Now, Doctor, from this examination that you con-

ducted on those two days were you able to arrive at an opinion regarding his mental condition?

A. Yes.
Q. And will you tell us what that opinion is?

A. My opinion was that he was not mentally ill or psychotic, or insane would be the legal word for it. That he
did not show abnormal personality traits or character
traits which would i nmy opinion place him in the category
of psychopathic personality.
Q. And could you describe this psychopathic personality
for us? That is, what type of person is a psychopathic person?

A. A psychopathic personality tends to be a person that
tolerates frustration very poorly, that reacts against others
in the environment as a result of the inner conflict or frustrations. They can be people that are, that tolerate authority
poorly. That are egocentric. That have little feeling for others. That fail to learn certain things from experience. They
repeat certain types of behavior after the average person
will learn that it didn't pay to do so.
Q. And did you find in your examination, Doctor, or

could you establish any opinion as to whether or not he was
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suffering from any mental disease?
A. My opinion was that he was not suffering from a
mental disease; that this represented abnormal personality
traits or character traits rather than a definite mental
illness.
Q. Now, Doctor, if you were to learn that this same man,
assuming that you were to learn that this same man had had
a sample taken of his spinal fluid and that it was tested on
two occasions, once when tested it was. a two plus and on the
other occasion it was a three plus. Do you think that would
have any bearing on your opinion or change it in any way?

A. Not just that fact wouldn't change it.
Q. Now, Doctor, I am going to put to you a hypothetical

question. Let us assume, Doctor, that Mr. Rodgers, the man
you examined, had had the spinal testis made and the results
were as I just stated to you, that is one a two positive and
one a three positive, and those tes~s were taken in November
of this year, and let's assume, Doctor, that he was working at
what is called the Rattlesnake Pit Mine here in LaSal
County. That he worked there about eight months prior to
June 19, 1957, and that on one occasion, that is he worked
with other men there, and on one occasion one of his fellow
workmen, Dee Gardner, who is a truck loader, had some
kind of an argument with him and Mr. Rodgers had struck
him at some time during that period of time. And let's
further assume that some time during that prior eight
months to June 19th he had some altercation with a Mr.
Goodnight, or some disagreement or argument over the
dumping of some ore, and that Mr. Rodgers had apologized
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later for what was said in the altercation and Mr. Goodnight stated, "I'll accept your apology, but I won't forget
it." And then let's assume that on three or four occasions
during that time he had bragged at least to one individual
about things that the individual didn't know whether they
were true or not and that this Mr. Rodgers was teased and
ribbed in the normal amount that a group of men will on
the job, and that on or about June 1st Mr. Rodgers had an
altercation with one Charles Merrifield in which there was
an argument over whether some equipment had been greased or not and during the course of that Mr. Merrifield had
called Mr. Rodgers a damn liar. And then let's assume that
on June the 18th, 1957, that Mr. Rodgers had said to one
'Dhomas Thompson that• he, Rodgers understood that Mr.
Merrifield was going to pick a beef with him and if he
did he'd be ready for him. And then let's assume that on
June 19th that Mr. Rodgers was working here in the pit
mine with other men and that during the course of the
work he had said to one Dennis Ingraham •.hat he was
going to have to kill Charles :Merrifield before he left, meaning Mr. Merrifield left the job. And that he also said that
Mr. Merrifield had been talking about me and calling me
something about Boss Jim. And that Mr. Rodgers further
said to Mr. Ingraham that he was going to get his gun. That
he then got in his truck and left the pit. Went down some
four hundred yards to his own truck and got a pistol out
of the truck, which was loaded. And drove back into the pit
and that during this time his demeanor was as usual according to the men who ''"orked with him. That he parked
the truck and got out. He walked directly toward the shovel
that Mr. Merrifield was operating and stood and waited for
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Mr. Merrifield to finish loading a dumpster which he was
loading. That during this time he took out his cigarettes
and lit one and stood and smoked it. That when the dumpster pulled out that Mr. Merrifield was continuing to work
with the shovel. That Mr. Rodgers took the gun out of his
belt, fired a shot into the ground. That Mr. Merrifield looked at Mr. Rodgers, at which time Mr. Rodgers motioned for
him to come to him. T·hat then Mr. Merri-field throttled
down the shovel, set the bucket half way in the air, and
turned and stood up in the door, at which time Mr. Rodgers
shot in a rapid burst of shots and hit Mr. Merrifield six
times. And that as a result Mr. Merrifield died. That Mr.
Rodgers then put the gun back in his belt, wa~ out of the
pit in the normal demeanor, saying to one of his fellow
workmen, "He had it coming. He asked for it and he got it."
That he then went to his pickup, drive up to his trailer,
loaded up his equipment and then left the scene and was
apprehended later in, near Cortez, Colorado. Now, Doctor,
if we assume all of those facts could you give us an opinion
as to whether or not you feel the man we have been talking
about here in this question knew the difference between
right and wrong at the time he shot the gun?
A. My opinion - First let me ask the beginning of that
question. You mentioned two plus and three plus.
Q. Yes.

A. I assume you meant to say Wasserman reaction for
syphilis.
Q. Well, these were spinal.
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A. Yes spinal, but it was a simple test for syphilis
was it?
Q. Yes.

A. My opinion would be that he did know the difference between right and wrong.
Q. And, Doctor, from that would you have an opinion
as to whether or not he knew the nature of the act that he
was doing?

A. I think that he did know the nature of the act that
he was doing.
Q. And, Doctor, would you have an opinion as to whether or not he was acting under uncontrollable impulses as
a result of mental disease?

A. My opinion would be that he did not control his impulses but that it was not from mental disease.
MR. BUNNELL: I believe that's all Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. REYNOLDS:
Q. Doctor, would it be fair to say that mental disorders
can be broadly classified into organic mental disorders and
functional mental disorders?

A. Yes that would be a fair statement.
Q. And they sometimes overlap don't they?

A. Yes they do.
Q. They fit in together. I mean they can have both
simoultaneously?

A. That's correct.
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Q. What are some of the examples of organic disorder, Doctor?

A. Oh, such things as mental disorders resulting from
senile changes in the brain or arterioscerotic changes in the
brain, or some instances brain tumors or in some instances
syphilitic infections of the central nervous system. There
are others.
Q. Syphilis is, has been referred to by some medical

people as a great imitator has it not?
A. That's correct.
Q. And among some of the diseases that, will you name
some of the diseases that it does imitate.

A. Oh, in certain instances types of syphilis can imitate
gastro intestinal disorders of other types. Or skin lesions
such as eczema or other rashes. Or some instances it can
somewhat imitate other mental illnesses such as schizophrena or manic stages. Manic depressive or manic, types
of manic depressive phychoses.
Q. Then when it is localized in the nervous system,

why then it would be affecting to the brain, isn't that
correct?
A. If an infection progresses to a certain point it does.
Or it can.
Q. And when it does that sometimes it can imitate the
paranoic person?

A. To some degree yes.
Q. And the, what are some of the symptoms of the
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paranoid~ that the paranoid exhrbits, Doctor?

A. You are referring to paranoid schizophenia or what?
Q. Well somebody with a paranoid personality what
would you say. I don't know the medical terms as well as you
do I'm sure.

A. I think the word paranoid refers to tendencies toward being suspicious or projecting ones difficulties on
others, or feelings of being wronged or discriminated
against. Sometimes it reaches the point of actual delusions.
Q. And sometimes it takes on the nature of a bragging

type of person?

A. Yes.
Q. A braggart?

A. Yes, that could be.
Q. Talk about the machinery that they had operated

or the mine that they had owned or sometimes as much as
being President of the United States and things like that
don't they?
A. Not the word paranoid. I think what you are referring to ow would be a paraoid delusion of a grandiose type.
Q. But these people you said were suspicious, jealous?

A. Yes.
Q. That would be fair to say?

A. Yes.
Q. And isn't it sometimes true, Doctor, that when these
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suspiciOns converge on some individual that it is serious
from the point of view of physical danger to this particular person?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. What are the usual tests given to determine whether a person ·has syphilis of the spinal nervous system,
Doctor?

A. Spinal fluid examination, neurological examination.
Q. Neurological?

A. Yes.
Q. And also psychological examination?

A. Not to determine syphilis.
Q. Well from a psychological examination couldn't you
get some indication that a man may have some organic
degeneration of the brain?

A. You could get some indication as to organic
changes but not as to specifically which.
Q. Well did you when you examined Mr. Rodgers here,

did you find any evidence at all of any organic disorder?
A. No I didn't.
Q. Did you notice any slurring of speech, for example,

which might have shown you that he was inarticulate and
that he couldn't talk properly which might indicate an
organic disorder?
A. I didn't notice anything unusual about his speech.
He talked very freely.
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Q. He talked freely, but I meant by that did you
notice any slurring of the words that he used?

A. I didn't notice any.
Q. Was there anything else that was brought out in
your examination that would indicate any possibility of
organic trouble in this man's mind?

A. No, I saw nothing whatever that would indicate organic changes in the central nervous system.
Q. Now if this man exhibited such things as suspicion
and was a braggart and has a persecution complex wouldn't
that in itself indicate that he might possibly !\~ve syphilis?

A. He wasn't bragging in the examination.
Q. I didn't ask you that though, Doctor. I asked you if
a man exhibited suspicion and things of that kind wouldn't
it be indicative of the possibility of syphilis?

A. That would be one possibility. There would be many
others.
Q. Yes, if a man, in other words if he exhibited the
things that, in his examination that you pointed out here a
few minutes ago about having these, having these suspicions and having a psychopathic personality and poor tolerance for frustration, wouldn't t:Jtose things in themselves
indicate from what you know about syphilis being the great
imitator that it might, that he might possibly have syphilis?

A. The personal history that he gave to me did not indicate t·hat he had, that his behavior since cildhood was the
result of syphilis.
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Q. The indications, now I think you testified here a few

minutes ago that when you examined him he, and gave him
your psychiatric examination you noticed that he had a
psychopathic personality, he had a low tolerance for frustration, that he had exhibited some evidences of suspicious
nature. Now aren't those things in and of themselves an
indication that he might have had syphilis?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. Well you stated here a few minutes ago, I believe
that, if I am not mistaken, that syphilis can imitate anything and that those are some of the chracteristics that
syphilitics sometimes exhibit.

A. It would be possible for syphilitic to exhibit those
things without having anything particularly wrong with
the central nervous system.
Q. When did you examine the patient, Doctor?

A. September 8th and 9th.
Q. This year?

A. Yes, this year.
Q. Where?

A. Salt Lake County Jail
Q. How long did your examination take?

A. Approximately one hour each day.
Q. What kind of examination did you conduct? Was it
confined exclusively to a psychiatric examination?
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A. That's right.
Q. Is that just interviewing?

A. Yes.
Q. The patient?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, Doctor, what you have said here I believe is
that with all of your knowledge and understanding about
syphilis, particularly after examining this man and noticing
that he had a psychopathic personality and low tolarance of
frustration, would you recommend a neurological examination?

A. I was asked to make a psychiatric examination of
him.
Q. Now Doctor, if you will -

A. And I arrived at a psychiatric opinion of his condition and felt that there was no, that the picture that was
presented psychiatrically was clear cut.
Q. Did you recommend a neurologic examination?

A. I made no recommendation.
Q. Did you make any recommendation that the man
have a spinal test made on him?

A. No I didn't."
In addition to the testimony given by the expert medical witnesses with respect to the mental condition of the
Defendant, see page 48, line 30, page 49, lines 1 through 5 of
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the transcript as testified to by Dennis Ingram, a witness for
the State. And when the same.Witness, Dennis Ingram, was
called on behalf of the Defendant his testimony reflected the
fact that the Defendant was a braggart, was "high tempered." See page 158 of the transcript, lines 1 througih 25, page
159 of the transcript, lines 28 to 30, page 160, lints 1 to 7 page
161, lines 11 to 15. And, it is also apparent from the testimonygiven by the witnesses for the State that the Defendant
had a "low tolerance for frustration" for he had had altercations with two of the witnesses who testified on behalf
of the State, one Dee Gardner and one Bobby Goodnight.
See page 69 lines 2 to 16 and page 70 lines 2 to 10. See also
page 103 lines 28 to 30 and page 104 lines 1 to 19. In addition, it is apparent that the Defendant had had altercation
with the deceased, Charles Merrifield. See page 47 lines 18
to 19, page 82 lines 28 to 30, page 83 lines 1 to 23, page 155
lines 24 to 30, page 156 lines 1 to 30, page 157 lines 1 to 6.
Finally, although there is no evidence other than the inference to be drawn from what the defendant told Dennis
Ingram just prior to the fatal incident, it seems obvious
that Merrifield had said something to two of the witnesses
who appeared at the trial to the effect that he would tell
Jim Rodgers if they didn't off their tail and go to work.
See page 86 lines 10 to 30, page 87 lines 1 to 15.
We point out the foregoing facts which were established at the trial of this matter not for the purpose of even
suggesting that if the Defendant had been ribbed, teased
and tormented that such fact would justify his killing
Charles Merrifield. The purpose of pointing out the facts
relative to the bragging and the difficulty which the De-
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fendant had with his fellow employees is simply for
the purpose oi emphasizing the peculiar behavior oi the
Defendant. Witness the fan incident as testified to by Bobby
Goodnight, see page 107 lines 26 to 30, page 108 lines 1 to 8.
W~e believe that the evidence concerning Defendant's bragging and grandiose at~itude, the evidence of difficulty with
several people at the Continental Mine, the evidence of the
fan incident and in fact, the killing itself without any apparent reason o:r provocation, substantiates and corroborates the expert evidence offered in the case by Drs. Powell,
Landward and Nelson.

From an examination of the statement made by the
Defendant on June 22, and June 26, which statements were
offered in evidence by the District Attorney, clearly show
that the Defendant's version of what occurred during the
fatal incidenti is an exaggerated interpretation of reality
and what actually occurred, and, accordingly, further demonstrates the psychotic delusions under which this Defendant was suffering at the time of the fatal incident.
If the jury had performed its duty to follow the law
and evidence offered in the case, it was dutybound to render
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Can there be
any doubt in the mind of any reasonable man that the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter, clearly establishes
that the Defendant was suffering from a severe organic
mental disorder characterized by psyc·hotic delusions
brought on by functional disorders and syphilis of the brain
and spina1 cord.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse the judgment in this case and remove the defendant
to the District Court with instructions to proceed with a
sanity hearing for the purpose of having the defendant
committed to the State Mental Hospital, for the two basic
reasons set forth below:

l.The State failed to sufficiently inform the defendant
of the crime he ·was accused of and the trial Court refused
to correct this omission of defendant's legal and constitutional rights although timely objections were made thereto.
2. That there is uncontradicted evidence based on
scientific facts that the defendant was acting under an irrestible impulse because of the organic lues change on
which point there was no evidence submitted by the State
to the contrary. The only evidence on the part of the State
with respect to organic mental disorders of the defendant
was the statement of Dr. Pace that he was requested to give
the defendant a psychiatric examination and that he did
not recommend that any neurological or spinal tests or
any test at all be given to determine the existence of
organic mental disorder.
Respectfully submitted,
A. Reed Reynolds
Robert H. Ruggeri
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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